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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the bargaining over how to combine lists of candi-
dates between rounds of the 2004 and 2010 French regional elections. Re-
gressions support the hypothesis that a party’s fraction of a coalition’s total
seats won will be equal to that party’s fraction of the total ﬁrst-round vote
of all parties represented in the combined list. However, there is a slight
tendency for small parties to get less than implied by this hypothesis. This
is the opposite of what is commonly found in studies of coalition formation in
parliamentary systems. The paper provides some support for the hypothesis
that this is due to the electoral rules determining when a party is allowed to
maintain their list in the second round. Finally, this paper examines prop-
erties of the function describing how a combined list divides any number of
seats won.
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There is a large literature examining the distribution of the payoﬀs to par-
ties involved in bargaining over the formation of a government. Although the
vast majority of the empirical part of this literature has focused on coalition
formation at the national level in parliamentary systems,1 there are other
situations in which parties bargain with each other. This paper examines
one such situation. In proportional representative systems in which votes
are cast for lists of candidates those lists can consist of members of more
than one party. Therefore, positions in a list determine how the parties have
agreed to divide any given number of seats won. The combined lists that re-
sulted from bargaining between rounds of the 2004 and 2010 French regional
elections are examined in this paper. As far as I know, there is no published
work that examines lists of candidates in this manner.
Brown and Franklin (1973) is the seminal work in the empirical literature
on coalition formation. They ﬁnd strong support for the hypothesis that the
fraction of government ministries a party receives is equal to the fraction of
the parliamentary seats of the governmental coalition held by that party. The
view that such a “proportionality norm” is the likely outcome of coalitional
bargaining is due to Gamson (1961). Brown and Franklin actually ﬁnd some
slight deviation from such a norm. Rather than 푌 = 푋, where 푌 is the
Gamson prediction, i.e. the percentage of a coalition’s total seats won by a
given party, and푋 is the the actual percentage of ministry portfolios obtained
by that party, they ﬁnd
푌 = −0.01 + 1.07푋 (1)
1There are exceptions such as Laver, Rallings, and Thrasher ((1987) and (1998)) which
examine local government coalitional payoﬀs in Britain. Also, there has been increasing
interest in pre-election election bargaining. Examples of such work are Golder (2006), who
examines the decision parties must make before an election of whether to run independently
or whether to combine with another party, and Blais and Indridason (2007), who examine
agreements between the Socialists and Greens in the 2002 French legislative elections.
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with an 푅2 = 0.855. This implies that small parties (those with less than
approximately 1/7 of a coalition’s total seats, get a slightly larger fraction of
ministerial positions than their share of the coalition’s seats.
There is a substantial literature that reﬁnes this basic observation.2 War-
wick and Druckman (2001) ﬁnd support for the results of Brown and Franklin
when diﬀerent ministerial portfolios are given diﬀerent weights based on their
desirability. Schoﬁeld and Laver (1985) replicate the results of Brown and
Franklin as well as examine the bargaining set as an alternative solution con-
cept. Their work shows that in some European countries the bargaining set is
a better predictor of coalitional payoﬀs than Gamson’s proportionality norm,
while in other countries the opposite is true. They suggest that Gamson’s
prediction works better in countries with fewer eﬀective parties and more
stable governments.
The main part of this paper examines how well a Gamson proportionality
norm explains the outcomes of the bargaining between rounds of French
regional elections. The next section describes the basic election rules and
data available for the French regional elections of 2004 and 2010. Then results
for these elections that are analogous to the Brown and Franklin results
involving Gamson’s proportionality norm are presented. These results are
then further analyzed to try to understand the eﬀect that the election rules,
which determine the bargaining power of the parties, have on the outcome.
I also present an estimate of a disagreement point3 Finally, the properties of
the implicitly deﬁned functions giving how any given number of seats won is
divided between the parties combining are examined for each region.
2See Laver and Schoﬁeld (1990) for a review.
3A disagreement point, which represents the outcome if no agreement is reached, is one
of the features of a Nash bargaining problem. See Nash (1950) for details.
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Bargaining Situation and Data
The results of the French regional elections of 2004 and 2010, along with the
lists of candidates submitted by the parties in each round, are available on
the French Ministe`re de l’Inte´rieur website, http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/
sections/a votre service/elections/resultats.4 The details of the procedures
for the 2010 regional elections are given in the “Dossier de Presse” for these
elections.5
Rather than submitting one list for a region, the election procedure in-
volves a party (or group of parties) submitting a diﬀerent list for each de-
partment within a region. If a party’s lists receive at least 10% of the total
votes cast in a region it is entitled (but not required) to maintain its lists for
the second round. If a party’s lists receive between 5% and 10% of the vote
in the ﬁrst round then it is called “fusionnable”, which means it is allowed
to combine with another party that has received at least 10% of the vote.
For this to occur, the parties must reach an agreement on how to combine
their lists. Party lists receiving less than 5% of the vote in the ﬁrst round
are eliminated. In the second round, the party receiving the most votes in a
region receives a “prime” (or bonus) of 25% (rounded up to the next integer)
of the total seats in the regional assembly with the remaining seats allocated
4This website was changed sometime after 2007 and now contains less detailed infor-
mation about the candidates on the parties’ lists. However, all the information needed
to produce the results in this paper are still available. The Tuesday (after the Sunday
voting) edition of Le Monde also gives the election results as well as more details about
which political parties are represented in a particular list.
5This is available at http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/sections/a votre service/elections/
actualites/regionales-2010. A similar document was available for the 2004 elections; how-
ever, there is no longer a link to that document on the Ministere de l’Interieur website.
The election rules were the same for the 2004 and 2010 elections. The regional elections
prior to 2004 had only one round with seats allocated proportionally.
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proportionally6 to all lists obtaining more than 5% of the total vote.7 If a
list receives a majority of the votes cast in the ﬁrst round, which did not
happen in any region, then the seats are allocated as described above with
no second round.
When discussing ﬁrst-round lists, I will typically use the word “party” to
refer to such lists even if a ﬁrst-round list consists of members of more than
one political party. In addition, I will usually label such ﬁrst-round lists based
on their largest party. The term “list” used alone will refer to a second-round
list, which is combined from various ﬁrst-round party lists. This convention
will be followed even though ﬁrst-round lists sometimes contain members of
parties that are also running their own ﬁrst-round list. For example, there
are several instances in 2004 of UMP ﬁrst-round lists containing people listed
as belonging to UDF even though UDF had its own ﬁrst-round list. This
will generally be ignored. Although I talk about bargaining between parties,
what is really being done is looking at bargaining between ﬁrst-round lists.
This paper examines how a combined list divides a given number of seats
between the members of the ﬁrst-round lists that have combined. The party
aﬃliation of individuals on a list is not considered. Only which ﬁrst-round
list that person belonged to is used.8
6Seats that remain to be allocated after the initial use of vote percentages are assigned
by the “me´thode de la plus forte moyenne”, which gives the next seat to the party with
the highest value of votes received divided by one more than the number of seats already
assigned to that party.
7The rules for the region of Corse are diﬀerent. The “prime” is smaller (3 of the 51
available seats). Any list with at least 5% of the ﬁrst round vote can run in the second
round. Also, any list can combine with a list entitled to run in the second round. For this
reason, I did not consider the elections in Corse. The elections in the “outre mer” regions
of Guadeloupe, Guyane, La Reunion, and Martinique were also not analysed.
8Actually, this is all that I can do since I only have limited party aﬃliation information
for the 2004 elections. The party aﬃliation of individuals on ﬁrst-round lists is not given
for the 2010 election on the Ministere de l’Interieur website. This information for the 2004
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Technically, any eligible party can combine lists with any other eligible
party. Therefore, the situation is really a coalition formation problem along
with a bargaining problem that determines how the seats won by a given
coalition are allocated to the members. In fact, there are really two points in
time when coalitions can form. First, before the ﬁrst round all parties have
the opportunity to submit combined lists with other parties.9 This paper
does not consider such pre-election bargaining and instead only examines the
bargaining that takes place between eligible party lists between the rounds
of voting.10
Although there were many parties that obtained the 5% minimum neces-
sary to be able to combine, all of the combined lists that occurred in these
elections consisted of combinations of the major parties of the right or left.
Table 111 summarizes the number of regions in which various parties ob-
tained the votes necessary to be able to combine and the combinations that
occurred.
In 2004 there were combined lists on both the left and right of the political
spectrum. On the right, the two mainstream parties, Union pour un mou-
elections is also no longer available on the website, although I still have a copy of the ﬁle
with this information.
9Bargaining before the ﬁrst round is actually an important factor in determining what
the ﬁrst round lists look like. Even among the major national parties, this bargaining
occurs at the regional level. For example in 2004, in some regions the Socialists, Com-
munists and Greens had a combined ﬁrst round list and in others one, or even all three,
had separate ﬁrst round lists. Pre-election agreements in diﬀerent parliamentary systems
are the focus of Golder (2006). However, she does not examine the composition of any
combined lists.
10There are also repeated game aspects to the bargaining that are ignored. The parties
involved compete and cooperate in periodic elections. So, one thing that might aﬀect
the bargaining in one election is how it aﬀects the relationship between parties in future
elections. This issue is ignored in this paper.
11All of the tables referenced in the paper appear in the online supporting information.
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vement populaire (UMP) and Union pour la de´mocratie franc¸aise (UDF),
ran separate lists in most regions in the ﬁrst round and then combined in
the second round.12 Lists on the right combined in 11 regions, including one
involving 3 parties.
On the left in 2004, all combined lists involved various combinations of
the Socialist (SOC), Communist (COM), and Green (VEC) parties.13 In
most regions, at least two of these parties submitted joint ﬁrst-round lists.
There were two instances of all three of these parties running separate ﬁrst-
round lists and then combining for the second round.14 Two parties on the
left combined in 6 other regions.
All of the other parties that obtained enough ﬁrst round votes to be eli-
gible to combine, Chasse peˆche nature et traditions (CPNT), Front national
(FN), Mouvement e´cologiste inde´pendant (MEI) and combined Ligue com-
muniste re´volutionnaire and Lutte ouvrie`re (LCR-LO) lists, never combined
with one of the largest parties.15 In total in 2004 there were 19 instances
of parties combining for the second round involving a total of 41 ﬁrst-round
lists.
12In Lorraine, these parties combined with another miscellaneous right-wing party. Also,
in Bourgogne, the parties did not combine and the UDF list did not run in the second
round even though it had received more than 10% of the vote.
13Actually, some of these lists also included members of smaller left-wing parties, such
as the Parti Radical de Gauche. However, all ﬁrst-round lists that combined in 2004 are
labeled with one of the three major parties on the left: SOC, COM, or VEC.
14This occurred in Nord-Pas-de-Calais and Auvergne.
15For the most part these are either extreme right (FN) or extreme left (LCR-LO)
parties that are not viewed as appropriate coalition partners. Although the CPNT did
take part in some ﬁrst round lists with the UMP and other parties, their president, Jean
Saint-Josse, announced that they would not combine with any other lists for the second
round. MEI was an independent ecologist party lead by Antoine Waechter, who was the
Green’s presidential candidate in 1988 and later left that party. Near the end of 2009, the
MEI merged with Europe Ecologie.
8
In 2010, the structure of the political parties on the left and right was
diﬀerent. After the 2007 Presidential election the UDF split into two parts.
One became the Mouvement de´mocrate (MoDem), lead by Franc¸ciose Bayrou
who sought to capitalize on his performance in the 2007 Presidential elections.
The other was the Nouveau Centre, which remained closely aligned with the
ruling UMP. The former ran its own lists in the 2010 regional elections and in
one region16 was able to maintain its list in the second round. On the other
hand, the Nouveau Centre did not run its own list in any region and allied
itself with the UMP. As a result of these changes, there was no combining of
lists of the right between rounds of the 2010 elections.
On the left there were also several changes. The most signiﬁcant change
was the creation of Europe Ecologie, which was a collection of Greens and
various other leftists. This new group did very well in the 2009 European
Parliamentary elections and ran lists in every region of continental France,
except Corse. Such lists are also denoted by VEC.17 Also part of the extreme
left of the Socialist party split and ran lists with the Communists as the Front
de gauche in most regions. Such lists are denoted by COP. First-round lists
consisting of both SOC members and either (or both) of COP and VEC
members are denoted by UG (union gauche). In 11 regions these two new
groups along with the Socialists were all eligible to combine18. In 9 of those
regions all three of those parties combined for the second round. In 10 other
regions, two parties on the left combined for the second round. Therefore,
in 2010 there were also 19 instances, which involved a total of 47 diﬀerent
ﬁrst-round lists, of parties combining for the second round.
16This was Bayrou’s home region of Aquitaine.
17This means that for 2004 VEC indicates a Green party list and in 2010 it indicates a
Europe Ecologie list. In November 2010, Europe Ecologie and the Green party merged.
18In Picardie, there were actually 4 lists on the left with more the 5% of the vote:
Socialists, Europe Ecologie, Front de gauche and a dissident group of Communists. In
that region only the Socialists and Europe Ecologie combined for the second round.
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Seat Allocation Functions
How the combined lists will be analyzed is now explained. If there was just
one list per party per region then by examining the order of individuals on
the combined list it would be possible to determine how the parties have
agreed to divide any given number of seats that they could win in the second
round. However, since the actual election involves lists for each department
in a region, ﬁnding how parties have decided to divide a given number of seats
requires assumptions about the distribution of votes received across depart-
ments. The number of seats won coming from a particular departmental list
is equal to the proportion of that party’s total regional vote obtained in that
department.19 Therefore, exactly which candidates are elected and thus how
the parties have divided a given number of seats between themselves depends
on the percentage of votes the combined lists obtain from each department in
the second round. This is unknown at the time the composition of the lists
must be made. So some assumption about this distribution of votes must be
made.20
When estimating the number of seats a combined list gives to each party,
it will be assumed that the distribution of votes across departments is the
same as the distribution of the sum of the votes obtained in the ﬁrst round
by the parties forming the combined list. This vote distribution is used to
divide a given number of seats among the diﬀerent departmental lists. Then
I can count how those lists allocate the given number of seats among the
parties. How a list allocates the seats to its constituent parties will be called
a seat allocation function.
19Any unallocated seats are again assigned using the “me´thode de la plus forte
moyenne”.
20Actually, this is also unknown to the parties involved. So they really face some un-
certainty in terms of how the composition of lists determines how a given number of seats
are allocated between the parties.
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However, this assumption does not necessarily make it possible to de-
termine how any number of seats won is divided. The reason is that the
ﬁrst-round distribution of votes obtained by the parties of a combined list
might not correspond to the distribution of registered voters. Therefore, if
a list were to win a very large fraction of the total number of seats then
its distribution of votes would have to be close to the distribution of voters
among the departments in a region and this might be very diﬀerent from
the distribution of ﬁrst-round votes. In such a case it is possible that us-
ing the ﬁrst-round distribution would require obtaining more seats from a
department than individuals on that department’s list.21 For this reason,
only estimates of how parties have divided less than 80% of the total number
of regional seats are used. This cutoﬀ is arbitrary; however, in none of the
regions did one list win more than 80% of the available seats. To win this
fraction of seats would require a list to win at least 11/15 or 73% of the total
second round vote. The largest win in our sample was the list combining 3
lists of parties of the left in Midi-Pyrenees in 2010, which obtained 67.77%
of the second round vote and won 69 of the 91 seats.
In order to check the hypothesis that the departmental distribution of
votes of a list is the same as that of the distribution of the sum of votes
received by the parties involved in a combined list, Table 2 gives the actual
seat allocation among the parties of a combined list and the seat distribution
given by the estimated seat allocation function for the same total number of
seats. These are exactly the same in 30 of the 38 combined lists and in only
case (2010 Ile de France) was more than one seat misallocated. So, this crude
test, suggests that our assumption about the second round vote distribution
can be used to estimate seat allocation functions that will give distributions
21In fact, the election rules require each departmental list to contain 2 more names than
the number of seats currently coming from that department. It is possible that the number
of a department’s members of the regional assembly changes as a result of the election.
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of seats between parties that is not too far from the actual distributions.
There is another issue related to seat allocation functions. This is that
only certain numbers of seats are possible for a list to win. This is because
of the the 25% bonus for receiving the most votes in the second round.
For example, with 2 lists competing in the second round, it is not possible
for a list to end up with 60% of a region’s seats. The winning list will get
25% of the seats for winning plus its vote share, which must be at least 50%,
of the remaining 75% of the seats. This means that with 2 lists in the second
round, a winning list will receive at least 62.5% of the seats. On the other
hand, a losing list can receive at most 50% of the 75% of seats that are
allocated proportionally or at most 37.5% of the seats. Therefore, if there
are two lists running in the second round then no list will end up receiving
between 37.5% and 62.5% of the seats.
If there are 3 lists competing in the second round then the possibilities
are somewhat diﬀerent. With 3 lists it is possible for a list to win with
only slightly more than one-third of the vote. Such a winning list receives
25% plus (1/3) times 75% or 50% of the seats. This is the minimum that
a winning list can receive since it is not possible to win with less than 1/3
of the vote when there are 3 candidates. On the other hand, a losing list
could receive as much as 50% of the vote and thus receive 37.5% of the seats.
Therefore, if there are three lists running in the second round then no list
will end up receiving between 37.5% and 50% of the seats.
When the seat allocation functions deﬁning how seats are divided in par-
ticular regions are examined, the data representing numbers of seats that fall
in the above ranges is excluded. The rationale is that since such numbers of
seats are not possible for a list to win the parties have no reason to worry
about how to divide that number of seats. This assumption is however some-
what arbitrary since not all possible number of seats are equally likely to be
obtained. This is particularly true when 3 lists are on the ballot in the second
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round. In order for a losing party to receive close to 37.5% of the seats it
must receive close to 50% of the vote in the second round. This would mean
that the third list obtains very few votes even though it received more than
10% of the ﬁrst round vote. Similarly, a winning list obtaining just over 50%
of the seats would have had to win a contest where all 3 lists received close
to 1/3 of the vote, even though the ﬁrst round vote shares might have been
very diﬀerent.
Even though our assumptions are somewhat arbitrary, it is unclear what
better ones would be. This paper can also be viewed as a simple ﬁrst pass at
analyzing the this situation. The graphs of seat allocation functions are given
in Table 4. When these individual seat allocation functions are analyzed the
data in these graphs are what will be used.
Bargaining Disagreement Points
One would expect the outcome of bargaining to depend in part on the bar-
gaining power of the parties involved. The election rules imply that diﬀerent
parties have diﬀerent degrees of bargaining power depending on how many
votes the party receives in the ﬁrst round and, therefore, whether or not the
party can maintain its list in the second round. Parties obtaining more than
10% of the regional vote can maintain their list in the second round, while
parties obtaining between 5% and 10% cannot. Therefore, one might expect
that such latter parties have less bargaining power than those parties that
have the right to present themselves in the second round. I attempt to test
this proposition in a later section.
No formal bargaining model will be presented. However, the idea of a
disagreement point of a Nash bargaining problem will be used. A disagree-
ment point is meant to describe the outcome if no bargaining agreement is
reached. This clearly depends on whether a party can maintain itself in the
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second round or not. In addition, what happens if parties fail to agree on a
combined list for the second round also depends on what eﬀect this failure
has on voting in the second round. This is something that is unknown. The
assumptions that I will make, along with some alternatives are described
next.
If a party receives between 5% and 10% of the ﬁrst round vote it is eligible
to combine with another list; however, if it does not do so then it cannot
submit a second round list on its own. Therefore, if there is no agreement
on a combined list such parties will receive no seats. So their disagreement
point number of seats will be assumed to be zero.
On the other hand, if a party receives more than 10% of the ﬁrst round
vote it is eligible to submit its own list for the second round. Therefore,
even if it does not reach an agreement to combine with another party, it has
the chance to win seats in the second round. Its disagreement point should
represent the number of seats it can be expected to win if it competes in
the second round on its own. This clearly depends on what agreements the
other parties reach and what choices are actually available to the voters in
the second round. There is also the issue of whether a party can crediably
threaten to withhold support in the second round in order to get its candi-
dates better positions on a combined list. Most of such issues are ignored,
as it is unclear how to deal with them. So, it will be assumed that a party
submitting a list on its own in the second round expects to receive the same
percentage of the total vote as it received in the ﬁrst round. It is also as-
sumed that such a party will not win in the second round and it will obtain
its proportional share of the seats remaining after the bonus is given to the
winning list. Therefore its disagreement point number of seats is equal to
75% of its ﬁrst-round percentage of the total vote times the total number of
regional seats.22
22In eﬀect, it can be thought that I am assuming a second round list expects no support
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An alternative to the previous assumption for parties that receive more
than 10% of the ﬁrst round vote is that they assume that they will get the
support of parties close to it in the political spectrum. Exactly which parties
this involves is not always clear. Also, it would be reasonable to expect
less support the farther apart the parties are. This would imply that there
would be little reason to combine with a party receiving less than 10% of
the vote and whose position is closer to your party than to your main rival
since that party could not run in the second round and its voters would vote
for your party rather than your rival in the second round. However, there is
little empirical support for such an assumption since parties that have close
relationships, e.g. Socialists and Greens, often combine even if the Greens
cannot maitain their list in the second round.23 For this reason, I ignore this
issue and estimate disagreement points using the two earlier assumptions.
Table 3 gives the estimated disagreement points along with the distribution
of seats given by the seat allocation function for the same number of seats.
Testing Gamson’s Prediction
A Gamson proportionality norm suggests that a natural hypothesis for the
bargaining problem considered here is that parties divide the seats won in
proportion to their relative vote shares in the ﬁrst round of voting. This is the
analogue of Browne and Franklin’s hypothesis that the fraction of ministries
received by a party equals the fraction of the ruling coalition’s parliamentary
seats that party holds. Testing this hypothesis for the combined second round
from the supporters of parties that are not included on the list. This is clearly not rational
since voters of small parties generally vote for some list in the second round.
23However, the logic of this assumption could provide part of the explanation for why
parties tend not to combine with extreme parties such as the Front Nationale or the 2004
combined Lutte Ouvrie`re/Ligue Communiste Re´volutionnaire (Trotskyist parties). Doing
so would make the combined list more extreme and therefore alienate voters in the center.
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lists of the 2004 and 2010 French regional elections is the ﬁrst thing that is
done in this section.
A regression analogous to the one of Browne and Franklin (1973) would
regress a party’s fraction of the total (regional) ﬁrst round vote of all parties
that are part of the second round combined list on that party’s fraction of
the total seats won by the combined list. This gives the regression:
푉 표푡푒% = .046 + 0.89푆푒푎푡% (2)
where 푉 표푡푒% is a party’s share of the total ﬁrst round vote of the combining
parties, which would be Gamson’s prediction for fraction of seats won by
that party, and 푆푒푎푡% is the actual fraction of seats obtained by that party.
The 푅2 of this regression is 0.967. There are a total of 88 observations, one
for each ﬁrst-round party list that combines in some region.
Below it will make more sense to think of the percentage of a coalition’s
seats given to a given party as a function of that parties share of the coalition’s
ﬁrst round vote. This results in the regression
푆푒푎푡% = −0.036 + 1.082푉 표푡푒%, (3)
which is shown in Figure 1 below along with the data points.
In contrast to the regression of Brown and Franklin, equation (2) above,
these regressions mean that small parties (i.e. those with less than approx-
imately 42 percent of the total ﬁrst round vote of the parties combining)
receive less than the fraction of seats predicted by the Gamson hypothesis.
This is opposite of the result found by Browne and Franklin that smaller
parties receive more ministerial positions than their proportional share of
the ruling coalition’s total seats.
One possible reason for this diﬀerence is that smaller parties are more
likely to fall below the 10% threshold for being able to mantain their list
in the second round. Such parties have less bargaining power since if no
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agreement is reached on a combined list then they will not be able to submit
a list for the second round and therefore get no seats. Parties with over
10% of the ﬁrst round vote can mantain their list in the second round and
therefore are likely to win some seats if they cannot agree on a combined
list. Therefore, a reasonable hypothesis would be that if a party received
between 5% and 10% of the total ﬁrst round vote, and thus cannot run in
the second round unless they combine with a party that received more than
10% of the vote, then such a party would receive fewer seats in a coalition
than predicted by the Gamson hypothesis.
To test this hypothesis, one can add a binary variable, called 퐶푎푛푅푢푛,
that is 1 if a party receives more than 10% of the ﬁrst round vote and
0 otherwise. Adding this binary variable along with the interaction term,
퐶푎푛푅푢푛 ∗ 푉 표푡푒%, to the regression gives
푆푒푎푡% = 0.024 −0.046퐶푎푛푅푢푛 +0.723푉 표푡푒% +0.341퐶푎푛푅푢푛 ∗ 푉 표푡푒%,
(0.034) (0.038) (0.172) (0.175)
(4)
with an 푅2 = 0.969 and the usual OLS standard errors given below each
coeﬃcient. The standard errors imply that only the coeﬃcient of 푉 표푡푒% is
signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level and the interaction term is signiﬁcant at slightly
over the 0.05 level (its p-value is 0.054).24 This suggests that only the slope
diﬀers between parties that can run in the second round and those that
cannot run. So there is some evidence that obtaining more that 10% of the
ﬁrst round vote and thus being able to run in the second round increases a
parties share of a coalition’s seats since the coeﬃcient of 푉 표푡푒% is statistically
24If White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariances are used then
퐶푎푛푅푢푛 is also signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level (p = 0.079) and the interaction term at the
0.02 level (p = 0.016). The coeﬃcient of 푉 표푡푒% remains highly signiﬁcant. These standard
errors allow for the possibility that the distribution of the error term is not independent
of the percentage of the vote received. This suggests that both the intercept and slope
vary depending on whether or not a party can maintain its list in the second round.
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higher at least at the 0.10 level.
This regression implies that for parties that can run on their own in the
second round the relationship between seats and vote share is
푆푒푎푡% = −0.022 + 1.064푉 표푡푒%, (5)
while for parties that cannot run on their own in the second round the rela-
tionship is
푆푒푎푡% = 0.024 + 0.723푉 표푡푒%. (6)
These regressions, along with the data distinguished by the binary variable
퐶푎푛푅푢푛 are shown in Figure 2.
The regression for parties that cannot run on their own in the second
round suggests that parties with a vote share larger than 0.024/0.277 = 0.09
do worse than predicted by the Gamson hypothesis. This is true of all such
parties in our sample since the minimum vote share is 0.11. On the other
hand, for parties that can run in the second round, the regression suggests
that those with a vote share larger than 0.022/0.064 = 0.345 do better than
predicted by the Gamson hypothesis.
Disagreement Points and Bargaining
Next, I examine the estimated disagreement points. First, I describe how
the standard view of a Nash bargaining problem could be applied to this
situation. This view is that there is a set of feasible expected payoﬀs to the
parties and a disagreement point, i.e. a point giving each party’s expected
payoﬀ if no agreement is reached. The Nash bargaining solution would be the
payoﬀ vector that maximizes the product of the diﬀerences between parties’
expected payoﬀ and their disagreement point. This (or some other ) solution
vector would be implemented by selecting a combined list that achieves the
desired expected payoﬀs. In order to be able to calculate a party’s expected
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payoﬀ one would need to know a party’s payoﬀ as a function of the number
of seats it obtains and the party’s subjective probability distribution over the
number of seats it could win.25 Since these things are unknown, one would
need to make assumption about such variables in other to obtain a formal
Nash bargaining problem. It is unclear to me what such assumptions would
be. Another issue is that there might not be a unique list that achieves
a desired vector of expected payoﬀs. For these reason I will not present a
formal bargaining model. Instead I will focus on a narrower hypothesis on
the relationship of the disagreement point and the combined lists.
The hypothesis that I will examine is related to another view of this
bargaining problem. I will assume that the parties view the situation as
really being a series of bargaining problems, i.e. how to divide the number
of seats won for each of the possible number of seats. The number of seats
to be divided is determined by the second round vote. However, no matter
what the number of seats won turns out to be, the combined list divides this
number of seats between the parties involved. Therefore, the combined list
can be used to obtain whatever division the parties want to achieve for each
number of seats won ex post. Again, the solution to this problem depends on
information about the parties that is unknown. However, one might argue
that it is reasonable to assume that the parties will divide the the number
of seats associated with the disagreement point in a way that corresponds to
the number of seats each party expects to receive at the disagreement point.
If parties can achieve the disagreement point by not reaching an agreement
then it seems reasonable that if a combined list were to win the same number
of total seats then the parties would want those seats divided in the same
way. This might seem especially true when parties view the combined list as
25A party’s expectation about the distribution of votes across department in a region
would also matter since the number of seats coming from a particular department’s list
depends on the fraction of the combined lists regional vote obtained in that department.
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a way of implementing a desired division of any number of seats won ex post.
Therefore, the hypothesis that is examined is that the estimated disagree-
ment point is on the seat allocation function. This is done by using the data
in Table 3, except that we will convert the raw number of seats into a frac-
tion of the total number of seats at the disagreement point. This gives the
variables 푑푖푠% giving the fraction of seats a party gets at the disagreement
point and 푙푖푠푡% giving the fraction of the total number of seats at the dis-
agreement point a party is allocated by the seat allocation function. Figure
3 shows the pair of these variables for each party.
Figure 3 also distinguishes parties based on whether or not all parties in
the associated list can maintain their ﬁrst-round list. If the binary variable
푎푙푙푟푢푛 = 1 then all parties of the combined list can submit their own list in
the second round, i.e. all parties involved have received more than 10% of the
ﬁrst round vote. If at least one party received less than 10% and therefore
cannot submit a second round list then 푎푙푙푟푢푛 = 0. The two regression lines
for these two sets of points is also given in Figure 3.
These two regression line can be found by estimating the following re-
gression equation including the 푎푙푙푟푢푛 binary variable:
푙푖푠푡% = 0.106 −0.131푎푙푙푟푢푛 +0.739푑푖푠% +0.314푎푙푙푟푢푛 ∗ 푑푖푠%,
(0.011) (0.028) (0.018) (0.054)
(7)
which has an 푅2 = 0.962. The constant term, 푎푙푙푟푢푛 binary variable, and
the interaction term are all signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at well less than
the 0.01 level. This regression also implies that for parties of a combined list
in which all parties can run on their own in the second round the relationship
the fraction of seats given by the seat allocation function and the fraction of
seats at the disagreement point is
푙푖푠푡% = −0.025 + 1.054푑푖푠%. (8)
while for parties in lists in which not all parties can run on their own in the
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second round the relationship is
푙푖푠푡% = 0.106 + 0.739푑푖푠%. (9)
In equation (8) the constant term is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
and the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1 at over the 0.15 level,
both individually and jointly. Therefore, for parties that are bargaining
with other parties, all of which can maintain their ﬁrst-round lists in the
second round, there is some statistical support for the hypothesis that the
disagreement point is on the seat allocation function.
On the other hand, the constant and slope coeﬃcient are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from 0 and 1, respectively, at less than the 0.01 level. The equation
implies that parties that get a small fraction of seats at the disagreement
point get more than that fraction of seats as allocated by the seat allocation
function. This can also be seen in Figure 3 by noticing that parties getting
no seats at the disagreement point generally get a positive number of seats
according to the list. These are parties that received less than 10% of the
ﬁrst-round vote and cannot run in the second round. Such parties, receive,
on average, receive a positive number of seats, i.e. they get more that the
disagreement number of seats. This might seem to contradict the earlier
results of equations (2) and (3) that small parties receive a smaller fraction
of seats than their share of the total ﬁrst-round vote of the parties in the list.
However, that result is about the actual seat distribution outcome, while the
disagreement point analysis is examining what would happen if a list only
won the number of seats associated with the disagreement point.
Seat Allocation Functions Properties
Now I turn to individual regions and examine the seat allocation functions
implied by combined lists. The ﬁrst question examined is whether the in-
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dividual seat allocation functions are linear and divide any possible number
of seats won in the same way as the ﬁrst round vote distribution. In other
words, I ask whether the parties combining in a second-round list use a
Gamson proportionality norm to divide every possible number of seats they
could win. In other words, do the parties select a list that implements a
proportionality norm ex post for every possible number of sets won?
The seat allocation functions, whose graphs are shown in Table 4 of the
supporting information, will be used to address this question. When there
are 3 parties combining for the second round, the seats allocated to the
two smaller parties are added together to form the variable 푂푡ℎ푒푟. Just
examining the graphs suggests that, at least in many regions, these seat
allocation functions are not linear. Therefore, in those regions, the answer
to the previous question would be no.
To examine this a bit more precisely, I run regressions of the form
퐿푎푟푔푒푠푡 = 푐+ 푎푂푡ℎ푒푟, (10)
where 퐿푎푟푔푒푠푡 is the number of seats allocated to the largest ﬁrst-round
list of the combined list, which is always either SOC or UMP list. The 38
regressions are summarized in the Table 5 and only use data for possible
number of seats won.
If the parties followed a Gamson proportionality norm to allocate every
possible number of seats won then the regressions should have 푐 = 0 and 푎
should be equal to the ratio of ﬁrst-round votes received by the largest party
to the sum of votes of the other parties combining. The estimates reject
at the 0.05 level the hypothesis that the slope coeﬃcient equals the ratio of
ﬁrst-round votes in 25 of the 38 cases.
One might think that this hypothesis would more likely to be satisﬁed
in situations where all parties can maintain their lists in the second round.
However, this hypothesis is rejected at the 0.05 level in 9 of 16 cases where
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all parties involved could maintain their lists in the second round, while it is
rejected in 16 of the other 22 cases. So the hypothesis is rejected less often
when all parties can maintain their ﬁrst-round lists; however, it is diﬃcult to
draw any strong conclusions from such a small sample.
Finally, I examine the nonlinearity of the seat allocation functions by see-
ing if this function diﬀers depending on whether the list wins in the second
round. This will be done by introducing a binary variable, 푀푎푗표푟푖푡푦, that
is 1 for a number of seats representing a majority and 0 otherwise. I also
introduce an interaction term involving this variable and 푂푡ℎ푒푟. The regres-
sions also only use data for possible numbers of seats won. The regressions
are reported in Table 6.26
If a seat allocation function is linear then the coeﬃcients of the binary
variable푀푎푗표푟푖푡푦 and its interaction term with 푂푡ℎ푒푟 should both be 0. The
joint hypothesis that both these conditions are true is rejected in 27 of 36
cases at the 0.05 level. Testing the hypothesis that the slope coeﬃcients are
the same is rejected in 20 of the 36 cases at the 0.05 level. This suggests that
a majority of the seat allocation functions are nonlinear. More work would
be useful to understand what is causing the nonlinearity in some regions.
Conclusion
This paper has examined the bargaining problem facing parties between
rounds of the 2004 and 2010 French regional elections. No formal bargain-
ing model is presented. I know of no theoretical model where bargaining is
explicitly over the composition of a list of candidates. Such a model would
be useful, not only for the situation considered in this paper, but also for
26Regressions for the 2004 elections in Limousin are not possible because of a lack of
variation in the number of seats allocated to the smaller party on both the right and the
left. So there are only 36 regressions.
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analyzing other elections in parliamentary systems.
The analysis presented is primarily descriptive. The focus has been to
see what one can learn from how the combined second-round lists of parties
implicitly divide a number of seats that might be won. I know of no other
empirical work that has examined lists of candidates in this way. As in
the literature on coalitional bargaining and allocation of ministries, I ﬁnd
strong support for a Gamson proportionality norm. However, as in this
other literature, there are also some deviations from exact proportionality.
More work is needed to discover any systematic deviations from such a norm
in this situation.
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Figure 1: Percentage of seats won vs. percentage of vote
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Figure 2: Regression with CanRun Dummy Variable
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Supporting Information (online only)
Table 1: Summary of Lists Eligible to Combine and Actually Combining
Notes: The above considers only 21 regions in France excluding Corse and the Outre Mer
regions. Also, lists above might contain members of other parties. Meaning of abbrevia-
tions are given in the text.
First-Round List
Composition
Number
of
Regions
Number
receiving
> 10%
Number
running
alone in
2nd
Number
combin-
ing in
2nd
Number
receiving
between
5% and
10%
Number
combin-
ing in
2nd
2004 Lists:
SOC,COM,VEC 8 8 8 0 0 0
SOC and COM 6 6 2 4 0 0
SOC and VEC 5 5 3 2 0 0
SOC alone 2 2 0 2 0 0
COM alone 7 2 0 2 2 2
VEC alone 8 1 0 1 7 5
UMP and UDF 6 6 6 0 0 0
UMP alone 15 15 4 11 0 0
UDF alone 15 9 0 8 6 3
FN 21 17 17 0 4 0
CPNT 9 0 0 0 6 0
LO-LCR 21 0 0 0 6 0
MEI 6 0 0 0 4 0
others 2 0 0 0 2 1
2010 Lists:
UG 5 5 0 5 0 0
SOC 16 15 1 14 1 0
VEC 21 12 1 11 9 8
COP 17 3 1 2 9 7
UMP 21 21 21 0 0 0
MoDem 20 1 1 0 3 0
FN 21 12 12 0 9 0
others 2 1 1 0 1 0
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Table 2: Summary of actual outcomes compared to the division given by
the seat allocation function assuming that second round departmental vote
distributions are the same as in the ﬁrst round for a list.
Department Parties Outcome Estimate
2004 Lists on the Right
Aquitaine UMP,UDF 12,9 12,9
Bertagne UMP,UDF 19,6 19,6
Centre UMP,UDF 13,7 13,7
Champagne-Ardenne UMP,UDF 10,5 10,5
Ile-de-France UMP,UDF 40,24 39,25
Limousin UMP,UDF 10,2 10,2
Lorraine UMP,UDF,DVD 16,1,2 15,2,2
Midi Pyrenees UMP,UDF 15,6 16,5
Nord-Pas de Calais UMP,UDF 18,6 18,6
Haute Normandie UMP,UDF 7,6 7,6
Pays de la Loire UMP,UDF 27,6 27,6
2004 Lists on the Left
Auvergne SOC,COM,VEC 18,7,5 18,7,5
Bertagne SOC,VEC 47,11 47,11
Ile-de-France SOC,COM 105,25 105,25
Limousin SOC,VEC 28,3 28,3
Nord-Pas de Calais SOC,COM,VEC 46,18,9 46,18,9
Basse Normandie SOC,VEC 21,7 21,7
Picardie SOC,COM 25,9 25,9
Rhone Alpes SOC,VEC 72,22 72,22
2010 Lists
Alsace SOC,VEC 8,6 8,6
Aquitaine SOC,VEC,COP 45,10,3 46,10,2
Auvergne SOC,VEC,COP 17,7,9 17,7,9
Bourgogne UG,VEC 31,6 32,5
Centre SOC,VEC,COP 29,12,8 29,12,8
Champagne-Ardenne UG,VEC 24,5 24,5
Franche-Comte SOC,VEC 20,7 20,7
Ile-de-France SOC,VEC,COP 74,50,18 75,48,19
Limousin SOC,VEC 23,4 23,4
Lorraine UG,VEC 37,9 37,9
Midi Pyrenees SOC,VEC,COP 47,15,7 47,15,7
Nord-Pas de Calais SOC,VEC,COP 42,15,16 42,15,16
Basse Normandie UG,VEC 23,9 23,9
Haute Normandie SOC,VEC,COP 25,6,6 25,6,6
Pays de la Loire UG,VEC 45,18 46,17
Picardie SOC,VEC 27,8 27,8
Poitou-Charentes SOC,VEC 30,9 30,9
Provence-Alpes-Cote-d’Azur SOC,VEC,COP 45,18,9 44,18,10
Rhone Alpes SOC,VEC,COP 53,37,10 53,37,10
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Table 3: Summary of estimated disagreement points compared to the division
of the seat allocation function at the same number of seats.
Department Parties Disagreement Seat Allocation
Point Function
2004 Lists on the Right
Aquitaine UMP,UDF 11,10 12,9
Bertagne UMP,UDF 15,6 16,5
Centre UMP,UDF 11,7 12,6
Champagne-Ardenne UMP,UDF 9,4 9,4
Ile-de-France UMP,UDF 38,25 39,24
Limousin UMP,UDF 7,0 6,1
Lorraine UMP,UDF,DVD 12,0,0 10,1,1
Midi Pyrenees UMP,UDF 12,6 13,5
Nord-Pas de Calais UMP,UDF 14,0 12,2
Haute Normandie UMP,UDF 8,5 7,6
Pays de la Loire UMP,UDF 22,8 24,6
2004 Lists on the Left
Auvergne SOC,COM,VEC 9,0,0 6,2,1
Bertagne SOC,VEC 23,0 19,4
Ile-de-France SOC,COM 50,0 40,10
Limousin SOC,VEC 13,0 13,0
Nord-Pas de Calais SOC,COM,VEC 25,9,0 22,7,5
Basse Normandie SOC,VEC 8,0 7,1
Picardie SOC,COM 11,4 11,4
Rhone Alpes SOC,VEC 37,11 38,10
2010 Lists
Alsace SOC,VEC 6,5 6,5
Aquitaine SOC,VEC,COP 23,0,0 20,2,1
Auvergne SOC,VEC,COP 9,3,5 10,4,3
Bourgogne UG,VEC 15,0 14,1
Centre SOC,VEC,COP 16,6,0 15,4,3
Champagne-Ardenne UG,VEC 11,0 10,1
Franche-Comte SOC,VEC 9,0 8,1
Ile-de-France SOC,VEC,COP 39,25,0 37,21,6
Limousin SOC,VEC 12,0 10,2
Lorraine UG,VEC 18,0 16,2
Midi Pyrenees SOC,VEC,COP 27,9,0 27,7,2
Nord-Pas de Calais SOC,VEC,COP 24,8,9 24,8,9
Basse Normandie UG,VEC 11,4 11,4
Haute Normandie SOC,VEC,COP 14,0,0 10,2,2
Pays de la Loire UG,VEC 23,9 24,8
Picardie SOC,VEC 11,0 9,2
Poitou-Charentes SOC,VEC 16,4 15,5
Provence-Alpes-Cote-d’Azur SOC,VEC,COP 23,10,0 20,8,5
Rhone Alpes SOC,VEC,COP 29,20,0 28,18,3
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Table 4: Seat Allocation Functions
This table gives the seat allocation functions for each combined list
in 2004 and 2010. The seat combinations that are not possible are
indicated by open circles. When three parties combined the graph
plots the estimated number of seats assigned to the largest party
against the sum, which is the variable called 푂푡ℎ푒푟, of the seats
assigned to the other two parties.
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Table 5: Seat Allocation Function Regressions
This table summarizes the regressions of the number of seats al-
located to the largest party on the sum of seats allocated to the
other parties in a combined second-round list. The table also gives
the ratio of the largest party’s ﬁrst-round vote to the sum of the
other parties ﬁrst-round vote for each combined list.
Department Constant Slope Coef Vote
(Parties) (std. err.) (std. err) Ratio
2004 Lists on the Right
Aquitaine 1.03 1.13 1.146
(UMP,UDF) (0.47) (0.03)
Bertagne 1.10 2.57 2.314
(UMP,UDF) (0.91) (0.09)
Centre 2.90 1.44 1.512
(UMP,UDF) (0.46) (0.03)
Champagne-Ardenne 2.05 1.96 2.400
(UMP,UDF) (0.53) (0.07)
Ile-de-France 7.09 1.36 1.538
(UMP,UDF) (0.46) (0.01)
Limousin 1.10 7.84 2.824
(UMP,UDF) (1.43) (0.70)
Lorraine 4.36 3.19 1.437
(UMP,UDF) (0.70) (0.10)
Midi Pyrenees 3.87 2.39 1.873
(UMP,UDF) (0.76) (0.07)
Nord-Pas de Calais 1.44 3.38 2.158
(UMP,UDF) (0.56) (0.05)
Haute Normandie 1.15 1.40 1.691
(UMP,UDF) (0.40) (0.04)
Pays de la Loire 5.16 2.56 2.662
(UMP,UDF) (0.65) (0.06)
2004 Lists on the Left
Auvergne 1.87 1.43
(SOC,COM,VEC) (0.60) (0.08) 1.905
Bertagne 6.14 3.56 3.969
(SOC,VEC) (0.56) (0.08)
Ile-de-France -1.29 4.27 4.435
(SOC,COM) (0.68) (0.04)
Limousin 8.69 7.17 6.830
(SOC,VEC) (1.04) (0.67)
Nord-Pas de Calais 2.64 1.58 1.763
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(SOC,COM,VEC) (0.37) (0.02)
Basse Normandie 5.64 2.46 2.856
(SOC,VEC) (0.86) (0.17)
Picardie 0.74 2.80 2.526
(SOC,COM) (0.69) (0.10)
Rhone Alpes 6.13 3.30 3.192
(SOC,VEC) (0.67) (0.04)
2010 Lists
Alsace 0.65 1.18 1.216
(SOC,VEC) (0.41) (0.04)
Aquitaine 8.76 2.85 2.397
(SOC,VEC,COP) (0.93) (0.11)
Auvergne 0.13 1.15 1.123
(SOC,VEC,COP) (0.39) (0.04)
Bourgogne 6.99 4.50 3.690
(UG,VEC) (0.76) (0.20)
Centre 5.89 1.20 1.471
(SOC,VEC,COP) (0.44) (0.03)
Champagne-Ardenne 6.35 4.32 3.656
(UG,VEC) (0.85) (0.25)
Franche-Comte 4.12 2.69 3.192
(SOC,VEC) (0.56) (0.12)
Ile-de-France 3.93 1.05 1.092
(SOC,VEC,COP) (0.31) (0.01)
Limousin 5.65 4.02 3.908
(SOC,VEC) (0.90) (0.29)
Lorraine 5.73 3.57 3.749
(UG,VEC) (0.63) (0.10)
Midi Pyrenees 7.76 1.77 2.009
(SOC,VEC,COP) (0.62) (0.05)
Nord-Pas de Calais 2.01 1.34 1.381
(SOC,VEC,COP) (0.36) (0.02)
Basse Normandie 2.26 2.54 2.712
(UG,VEC) (0.57) (0.11)
Haute Normandie 2.72 1.96 1.991
(SOC,VEC,COP) (0.44) (0.05)
Pays de la Loire 2.67 2.49 2.519
(UG,VEC) (0.46) (0.04)
Picardie 3.19 3.04 2.669
(SOC,VEC) (0.54) (0.09)
Poitou-Charentes 1.66 3.14 3.271
(SOC,VEC) (0.76) (0.13)
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Provence-Alpes-Cote-d’Azur 2.88 1.49 1.514
(SOC,VEC,COP) (0.40) (0.02)
Rhone Alpes 4.86 1.03 1.053
(SOC,VEC,COP) (0.34) (0.01)
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Table 6: Seat Allocation Function Regressions
This table summarizes the regressions of the number of seats al-
located to the largest party on the sum of seats allocated to the
other parties in a combined second-round list with a Majority bi-
nary variable and an interaction term.
Department Majority Slope Interaction
(Parties) Constant Binary Coef Term
(std. err.) (std. err) (std. err.) (std. err)
2004 Lists on the Right
Aquitaine 0.27 -12.08 1.28 0.33
(UMP,UDF) (0.60) (3.04) (0.08) (0.14)
Bertagne -0.38 30.51 2.85 -2.05
(UMP,UDF) (0.86) (2.17) (0.19) (0.23)
Centre 3.10 -19.98 1.43 1.00
(UMP,UDF) (0.44) (3.22) (0.08) (0.18)
Champagne-Ardenne 2.89 -5.98 1.59 0.90
(UMP,UDF) (0.54) (2.29) (0.18) (0.27)
Ile-de-France 5.14 4.08 1.52 -0.21
(UMP,UDF) (0.49) (3.39) (0.03) (0.07)
Lorraine 6.19 -8.92 2.20 1.76
(UMP,UDF,DVD) (0.78) (2.92) (0.19) (0.35)
Midi Pyrenees 1.37 21.32 2.84 -1.57
(UMP,UDF) (0.54) (1.86) (0.17) (0.19)
Nord-Pas de Calais 2.93 2.13 2.98 0.21
(UMP,UDF) (0.93) (2.78) (0.14) (0.21)
Haute Normandie 0.85 5.19 1.44 -0.37
(UMP,UDF) (0.48) (1.71) (0.14) (0.17)
Pays de la Loire 2.76 14.32 3.32 -1.48
(UMP,UDF) (0.59) (6.90) (0.20) (0.44)
2004 Lists on the Left
Auvergne 3.31 1.18 0.83 0.47
(SOC,COM,VEC) (0.53) (5.61) (0.11) (0.43)
Bertagne 6.86 11.46 3.11 -0.56
(SOC,VEC) (0.79) (3.99) (0.22) (0.41)
Ile-de-France 1.78 -19.84 3.85 1.08
(SOC,COM) (0.78) (3.52) (0.09) (0.16)
Nord-Pas de Calais 1.17 0.78 1.82 -0.22
(SOC,COM,VEC) (0.46) (2.10) (0.05) (0.09)
Basse Normandie 2.72 -15.72 6.11 -1.14
(SOC,VEC) (0.67) (5.56) (0.48) (0.88)
Picardie 1.33 10.25 2.38 -0.67
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(SOC,COM) (0.80) (1.69) (0.24) (0.29)
Rhone Alpes 7.71 -33.14 3.02 1.68
(SOC,VEC) (0.70) (3.55) (0.11) (0.19)
2010 Lists
Alsace 0.16 5.68 1.28 -0.47
(SOC,VEC) (0.69) (1.42) (0.15) (0.17)
Aquitaine 3.26 22.74 5.27 -3.80
(SOC,VEC,COP) (0.72) (1.44) (0.26) (0.28)
Auvergne 0.21 -9.34 1.13 0.62
(SOC,VEC,COP) (0.45) (7.91) (0.11) (0.54)
Bourgogne 7.23 -16.73 4.27 3.23
(UG,VEC) (1.05) (7.02) (0.60) (1.40)
Centre 5.16 1.70 1.42 -0.27
(SOC,VEC,COP) (0.69) (1.85) (0.14) (0.17)
Champagne-Ardenne 5.82 -10.32 5.63 0.87
(UG,VEC) (0.91) (4.90) (0.82) (1.43)
Franche-Comte 3.62 3.59 3.11 -0.89
(SOC,VEC) (0.77) (2.10) (0.37) (0.48)
Ile-de-France 1.93 -1.22 1.18 -0.09
(SOC,VEC,COP) (0.36) (3.81) (0.02) (0.06)
Limousin 5.04 11.74 3.26 -1.56
(SOC,VEC) (0.90) (1.12) (0.60) (0.62)
Lorraine 4.73 14.27 3.81 -1.65
(UG,VEC) (0.64) (1.47) (0.24) (0.29)
Midi Pyrenees 6.52 -3.55 2.19 -0.22
(SOC,VEC,COP) (1.05) (7.28) (0.18) (0.40)
Nord-Pas de Calais 1.52 6.58 1.38 -0.24
(SOC,VEC,COP) (0.43) (2.21) (0.04) (0.08)
Basse Normandie 3.33 9.02 1.83 -0.38
(UG,VEC) (0.54) (4.16) (0.18) (0.55)
Haute Normandie 2.20 -0.20 2.19 -0.18
(SOC,VEC,COP) (0.56) (2.61) (0.17) (0.29)
Pays de la Loire 2.15 19.62 2.60 -1.15
(UG,VEC) (0.56) (3.52) (0.10) (0.23)
Picardie 3.86 2.60 2.57 0.11
(SOC,VEC) (0.59) (2.64) (0.26) (0.41)
Poitou-Charentes 3.46 -8.46 2.13 1.87
(SOC,VEC) (0.61) (7.42) (0.19) (0.94)
Provence-Alpes-Cote-d’Azur 3.56 -4.49 1.40 0.21
(SOC,VEC,COP) (0.62) (1.46) (0.05) (0.07)
Rhone Alpes 2.92 -4.58 1.23 -0.07
(SOC,VEC,COP) (0.41) (1.78) (0.03) (0.05)
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